Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Diane R. Dautel v. David F. Dautel : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ephraim H. Frankauser. Attorney for Appellee
Neil B. Crist, Paul W. Mortensen. Attorney for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Dautel v. Dautel, No. 940130 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5832

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BFtlEF
UTAH
DGCU?v'<£*%7

K

;: u

5G
.A-sO
DOCKET NO

WI3C7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE R. DAUTEL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 940130-CA
vs.
Argument Priority 15
DAVID F. DAUTEL,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court of
Davis County, State of Utah
THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. NEWEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Ephraim H. Fankhauser, #1032
243 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

Neil B. Crist, #0751
Paul W. Mortensen, #2331
380 North 200 West, #214
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Appellant

r

| |

Aim I

™ W&Bte MUB

i
wttr

OCT 71994
COURT OF { ^ E A L S

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE R. DAUTEL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 940130-CA

vs.
Argument Priority 15
DAVID F. DAUTEL,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court of
Davis County, State of Utah
THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. NEWEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Ephraim H. Fankhauser, #1032
243 East 400 South, #200

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

Neil B. Crist, #0751
Paul W. Mortensen, #2331
380 North 200 West, #214

Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
APPROVING, AND SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET
ASIDE THE STIPULATION SINCE WIFE WAS SUFFERING
FROM EXTREME ANXIETY AND WAS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF MEDICATION

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO ENTER SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT
JUSTIFYING ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY
AWARDS

POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
APPROVING, AND SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET
ASIDE, INEQUITABLE AWARDS OF ALIMONY, CHILD
SUPPORT AND PROPERTY

10

CONCLUSION

10

i

TABLE OP AUTHORITIES
CASES
Kanzee

v.

Kanzee,

668 P. 2d 495 (1983)

5

Larson

v.

Collina,

684 P. 2d 52 (1984)

9

Lee

Lee,

v.

744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987)

ii

9

NEIL B. CRIST, #0759
PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #2331
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
380 North 200 West, #214

Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 298-7200
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant respectfully submits the following brief
responding to the Brief of Appellee.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Husband, while disputing the quantity of Xanax

taken by Wife and the effect thereof on Wife, concedes that Wife
suffered from severe anxiety.

In paragraph 6 of Husband's

Statement of Facts, Husband states: " . . . Plaintiff's difficulty

in making correct decisions was due to her indecisive personality
disorder, not the medications. . . . "

This admission is directly

relevant to Wife's first point of appeal which is based upon
Wife's impaired judgment due both to her anxiety condition and
the effects of medication.
2.

At paragraph 8, Husband erroneously claims to have

refuted Wife's testimony of harassment by him.

Husband's

authority for such position is a verified reply filed by Husband
in response to Wife's motion to set aside the stipulation.
Husband, during his testimony at the hearing, did not contest
Wife's testimony that Husband had harassed her for a period two
weeks prior to trial, and that at the settlement meeting the day
before trial he had thrown books on the table and threatened to
leave the state or go to jail rather than support his family. (R.
39, 514, 570, 571)

Husband's only testimony related to the issue

came about indirectly during his adverse examination regarding
property distribution when he acknowledged that he entered Wife's
home two or three months after separation and removed items.
(R. 699)
Husband's harassment of Wife prior to trial was calculated
to exploit Wife's anxiety disorder.
3.

At paragraph 8, Husband also claims to have

personally refuted Wife's impairment.

Again, however, Husband's

cite is to his verified reply, not to (non-existent) testimony
offered at the hearing.
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4.

At paragraph 9, Husband refers to affidavits filed

by Wife and her doctor prior to the hearing and alleged
inconsistencies between those documents and testimony at trial.
The trial court's oral ruling (R. 728-737) was not based upon
these matters, but instead rested upon the court's less than firm
finding that Wife could have consumed all of her prescription of
Xanax before the date of trial (R. 734-735) and its finding that
the amount Wife claimed to have taken did not exceed that
prescribed. (R. 734)

Nevertheless, Wife will address matters

referred to in paragraph 9 of Husband's statement of facts

seriatim.
(a)

Dr. Wilson's testimony at trial concerning the

amount of Xanax prescribed varied in favor of Husband's position
and the testimony regarding the same is duly noted at page 6 of
Wife's Brief of Appellant.
While Dr. Wilson noted no problems regarding Wife's use of
Xanax on March 17, 1993, Wife never contended that she had any
problem with Xanax at this time. Wife testified that her anxiety
and consumption of Xanax increased during the period of about two
weeks prior to trial and her psychologist, Kirk B. Thorn, Ph.D.,
testified that Wife's anxiety increased as trial approached. (R.
513, 598)

It is precisely this distinction between previous low

use and dramatically increased use of Xanax immediately prior to
trial upon which Wife's contention of impairment rests.
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(b)

The distinction between .5 milligrams every 8

hours and .5 milligrams every 12 hours at the time the
prescription was first made is minor and does not materially
relate to the issues of how much Xanax Wife was allowed to take
and how much Xanax she had taken immediately prior to the time of
trial.
(c)-(f)

The distinction between number of pills taken

versus the number of milligrams taken caused confusion in the
proceedings.

While Wife's testimony regarding the exact number

of pills taken and the exact number of milligrams contained minor
variations, the key point of her testimony was that she had
dramatically increased her intake of Xanax immediately prior to
trial.

Although it can be speculated that Wife could have used

up her supply of Xanax prior to trial, the fact remains that an
independent witness testified to giving Wife Xanax the night
prior to trial. (R. 660)
Nowhere at trial or in Wife's Brief of Appellant has it been
represented that Dr. Wilson examined Wife on the day of trial.
Dr. Wilson testified to the side-effects of Xanax under various
assumptions.

It was left to the Court to apply Dr. Wilson's

testimony to the facts in this case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION
SINCE WIFE WAS SUFFERING FROM EXTREME ANXIETY AND WAS
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MEDICATION
A.

THREE MONTH TIME PERIOD

At Page 20 of his brief Husband asserts that Wife's motion
to set aside the stipulation was untimely because it was not
brought within three months of the April 28, 1993, trial date.
Kanzee

v. Kanzee,

668 P.2d 495 (1983), relied upon by Husband

recognized that a motion to set aside a decree under Rule
60(b)(1, 3, 4) must be brought within three months of the date of
entry of the decree.

When Wife filed her motion to set aside the

stipulation on July 30, 1993, the findings and decree had not yet
been entered and they were not entered until September 17, 1993.
Therefore, Wife's motion was timely filed since it was filed four
and one-half months prior to the required time for filing.
B.

COURT APPROVAL OF STIPULATION

At pages 22 and 23 of his brief Husband sets forth in detail
much of the discourse between counsel and the trial court prior
to the point where Wife gave her confused and reluctant consent
to the stipulation.

The key distinction here is that the lengthy

recitation of the stipulation occurred before Wife was asked to
approve the stipulation and responded, "I think so.", "I guess.11,
"I'm a little iffy on it.", and, "I'm questioning it a little
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bit, but I guess I'll go along with it." While court and counsel
may arguendo,

have been having a deep and meaningful discussion

prior to the time Wife was asked to approve the stipulation, such
discussion has no bearing upon Wife's ability to understand and
approve the stipulation since she did not take part in this
discussion and her comments immediately thereafter evidenced
confusion rather than coherent participation.
C.

ALLEGED FAILURE TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE

Husband at pages 26 and 27 of his brief tosses up the buzz
words "failure to marshall evidence" and then raises various red
herrings in a vain attempt to support this claim.

These red

herrings and Wife's response thereto are:
1)

"Plaintiff was not seen or observed by Dr. Wilson

or Mr. Thorn the day before trial or the day of trial."

Wife's

brief at no time states or implies that Wife was examined by
these professionals at these times.

On the other hand, Dr. Thorn

testified that he noted an increase in Wife's anxiety as her
trial neared and that he had seen her on April 19, 1993.

This

was cited at page 7 of Wife's Brief of Appellant.
2)

"Judge Newey listened to and observed the

Plaintiff through the entire proceedings ..."

Wife at page 15 of

her brief cited the court's finding that Wife did not appear to
be impaired at trial.

Wife never claimed that the court had not

had the opportunity to observe her on April 28, 1993.
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On the other hand, the transcript shows that the trial court
spent the vast majority of time listening to the attorneys recite
the stipulation while its conversations with Wife were cursory
and elicited only short, confused answers of few words from Wife.
3)

"... the testimony of Mr. Thorn and Dr. Wilson was

based upon speculation and not upon actual observation."
not an accurate characterization of the testimony.

This is

Furthermore,

Wife's brief made no claim that these professionals had examined
Wife the day of trial.

These professionals testified competently

about what they had observed during their meetings with Wife.
Dr. Wilson's testimony cited at page 9 of Brief of Appellant was
not in the form of opinion testimony but merely a statement of
side-effects associated with Xanax generally.

Such testimony was

competent and available to assist the finder of fact to assess
the effect increased doses of Xanax could have had upon Wife.
4)

"Plaintiff's first complaint ... came 4 months

after the court proceedings of April 28, 1993 ..."

Wife's brief

at page 4 advised this Court of the July 30, 1993, date of the
Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation.
states:

Her brief at page 12

"...(the findings and decree) were not signed by the

court until nearly five months after the date of stipulation.
(R. 136)

In the meantime, Wife concluded that her attorney had

not protected her rights, obtained new counsel, and filed a
Motion to Set Aside Stipulation.

(R. 137, 142)"
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Wife moved to withdraw her stipulation over one and one-half
months before the findings and decree were entered while disputes
continued between the parties over the drafting of the findings
of fact and decree.

Therefore, Wife's withdrawal of her consent

to the stipulation was not only timely but four and one-half
months prior to the three month deadline in which to file a
motion to set aside.
Husband's problems with Wife's brief relate to arguing the
facts, not setting them forth.
Wife's brief.
D.

The material facts are cited in

Wife has no duty to argue Husband's case for him.

FAILURE TO CONSIDER INCREASED CONSUMPTION OF XANAX

Husband's brief parallels the trial court's failure to consider
the issue of sudden increased consumption of Xanax.

Both

Husband's brief and the trial court's ruling (R. 734) emphasized
that the amount of Xanax Wife testified to have taken during the
period prior to trial would have been within the maximum amount
allowed over a 24 hour period.

However, neither Husband's brief

nor the trial court's ruling responds to Dr. Wilson's testimony
that a substantial increase in the usage of Xanax over a 24 to 48
hour period will cause individuals to "not think well at all."
E.

SEVERE ANXIETY DISORDER ACKNOWLEDGED

At paragraph 6 of his statement of facts, Husband states,
"... Plaintiff's difficulty in making correct decisions was due
to her indecisive personality disorder, not the medications...."
This statement acknowledges that Wife's anxiety was greatly
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beyond the form of tension that typically accompanies litigation
and is consistent with Dr. Thorn's testimony that Wife "becomes
pretty confused at times and really indecisive and that's the
symptom of the depression that she was experiencing."(R. 515)

1

Wife's first point for appeal is based upon her impairment
from both her extreme anxiety and the effect of the medication.
The confirmed severe anxiety together with the dramatically
increased consumption of Xanax resulted in Wife's confused and
tentative responses to the trial court when asked if she agreed
to the stipulation.

While it may be argued as to which factor

most affected her capacity to make proper decisions, the fact
remains that Wife's judgment was clearly impaired and Wife should
have been allowed to withdraw from the stipulation.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
ENTER SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT JUSTIFYING ALIMONY,
CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY AWARDS
Husband's reply brief does not effectively defend the trial
court's failure to make subsidiary findings as required by Lee
Lee,
Larson

744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987).
v.

Collina,

v.

Husband's reliance on

684 P.2d 52 (1984) to contend that no specific

findings were necessary is misplaced since Larson

predated Lee,

and involved a default judgment in a paternity action rather than

^hile suffering from her anxiety disorder, Wife had been
required to deal with Husband's change of sexual preference, her
extreme fear of acquiring AIDS and Husband's harassment prior to
trial. (R. 39, 132, 513, 514, 570, 514, 516)
9

a divorce settlement.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in

Larson

reversed part of the judgment because of the trial court's
judgment failure to take evidence and make findings, id.

at 56.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE, INEQUITABLE AWARDS
OF ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY.
Point II of Husband's Reply Brief fails to respond to the
obvious inequities set forth in Wife's brief regarding the
property settlement.

No rational explanation is given as to why

alimony was set so low, why Wife should have waived her claim for
accrued and unpaid temporary alimony, why Wife should have
accepted less than half of the marital estate by conceding a
$7,000 "equalization" payment to Husband as well as her claim to
Husband's 401K plan and why Husband should not have been ordered
to pay Wife's attorney's fees.
The agreement was unconscionable and must be set aside.

CONCLUSION
Wife must be awarded the relief requested in her Brief of
Appellant.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/^ ^

day of October, 1994.

NEIL B. CRIST
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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